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Abstract
More than 65 years have passed since yogurt was first introduced in
Japan, and the yogurt market is still growing there. The recent mar-
ket growth is said to be stimulated by a group of products with newly
found lactic-acid bacilli which are claimed to have features including
protection from virus-infection, allergies and so forth. However, it is
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empirically unknown if manufacturers are really rewarded with higher
margins from brands with these features as the average retail price of
yogurt kept decreasing over the last decade. To uncover factors re-
sponsible for such a phenomenon, we employ Che et al. (2007) because
they incorporate important facets of enterprises such as the strategic
interaction among manufacturers and retailers, consumer state depen-
dence, and forward-looking behavior of firms. With Japanese yogurt
panel data from January 2007 to December 2008, we find that (1) man-
ufacturers producing brands with special features successfully charge
more margins as expected; (2) a retailer also charges higher mar-
gins for these brands; and (3) a retailer has slightly higher amount of
margins than manufacturers, reflecting Bertrand competition among
manufacturers and vertical Nash game between manufacturers and a
retailer.
1 Introduction
Since yogurt was first introduced in Japan in 1950’s, the market kept growing.
The recent market growth is said to be stimulated by a group of products
with newly found lactic-acid bacilli, which are claimed to enhance immune
strength and prevent consumers from virus-infection, allergies and so forth.
The traditional marketing theory would predict that these manufacturers’
efforts are rewarded with high margins. The average price of yogurt, how-
ever, kept decreasing over the last decade and the temporal price reduction
(“TPR” henceforth) is prevalent practice in this category, with 66.7% of su-
permarket engaged in TPR in a sampled week according to the retail survey
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in 2007.1
In this paper, we try to uncover factors responsible for such a phe-
nomenon. The possible explanations include market pressure for lower price,
bargaining power imbalance between manufacturers and retailers where one
of channel members squeezes the margin of the other, or increasing price
competition among manufacturers. To identify which of these factors are ac-
tually in effect, we need to decompose prices into margins of manufacturers,
those of retailers, and marginal costs and assess their relative magnitude.
This requires to model both demand and supply-side behavior as supply-side
behavior would be affected by the market demand condition. Moreover, since
some consumers switch brands in this market, inferred from prevalent prac-
tices of TPR and the nature of product, consumer state dependence must
also be incorporated in demand model for plausible investigation.
In addition to strategic interaction among manufacturers and retailers and
consumer state dependence, a model needs to accommodate forward-looking
behavior of firms as pricing behavior of firms could be drastically altered if
they engage in such behavior as found in empirical paper of Che et al. (2007).
In their research, both manufacturers and retailers in U.S. cereal market
are shown to set prices accounting for the effect of current prices on future
profit while incorporating strategic interaction among firms and consumer
state dependence. The fundamental marketing issues of unobserved demand
1Compared to 2003, the average retail price of boxed yogurt in stores in Tokyo area
fell by 7.5% in 2008, and it further fell by 14.9% in 2013 according to “Retail Survey”
conducted by Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan.
Data regarding TPR are obtained from “National Survey of Prices” conducted by Statistics
Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications and calculated from data of
“Distribution of Regular Prices and Sale Prices by Sales Floor Space, Type of Outlets -
Japan, City Groups, Prefectures.”
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characteristics, heterogeneity across household, and price endogeneity are
also accounted for in their model. Therefore in this research, we employ the
comprehensive model of Che et al. (2007) to the yogurt data in Japanese
market to uncover the structure of this market.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the
model. In section 3, we present our estimation procedure. We briefly explain
our data in section 4. In section 5, we will present and discuss results for
empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section, we specify both demand- and supply-side models. As we im-
plied, there are three major dimensions in the modeling framework, which are
strategic interaction among manufacturers and retailers, consumer state de-
pendence, and forward-looking behavior of firms. Out of them, consumer
state dependence is modeled in demand-side and the rest is modeled in
supply-side. This approach of structural market equilibrium model enables
the analysis of supply-side behavior by observing only the demand-side data,
which is an advantage of the model as supply-side information is rarely avail-
able to researchers. Examples of papers in this line include Besanko et al.
(1998), Sudhir (2001), Yang et al. (2003), Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005) and
Che et al. (2007) to name a few. Because supply-side behavior is estimated
conditional on the estimation results of demand-side model, we start with
demand-side model.
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2.1 Demand−Side Specification
The brand choice model Let us suppose there are j = 1, . . . , J brands
in the market and each household i = 1, . . . , I has ti = 1, . . . , Ti purchasing
occasions. We employ the multinomial logit model for household brand choice
behavior. Specifically, the probability of household i choosing brand j at its
ti-th purchasing occasion is defined to be Prijti and is written as
Prijti =
exp(vijti)
1 +
∑J
k=1 exp(vikti)
(2.1)
where vijti = xjti · βs + simkj · SDs + ξjti is the deterministic part of the
utility function.2 The addition of 1 in the denominator stands for the outside
option which results from the specification vi0ti = 0. The set of explanatory
variables indexed by vector xjti include brand dummy variables and price of
brand j a household i faces on purchasing occasion ti, simkj is the attribute
similarity index for brand j with respect to the previously purchased brand k,
and ξjti is the unobserved demand characteristics which can be observed by
firms and households but not by a researcher. The examples of unobserved
demand characteristics are national advertisement, coupon availability, shelf
space allocations and so forth. As prevalent in this study field, we assume
it commonly affects all households (Besanko et al., 1998; Villas-Boas and
Winer, 1999; Villas-Boas and Zhao, 2005). Parameters to be estimated are
βs and SDs, where a subscript s = 1, . . . , S corresponds to segment (i.e.,
a subset to which households belong to, where those in the same segment
are assumed to be the same in terms of responsiveness to marketing mix
2The term ξjti is a subset of ξjt where the latter is defined for all calendar dates and
brands in the panel, and the former is retrieved from the latter according to ti. On the
other hand, the values of xjti may be different depending on households even when two
households shop at the same time as temporal price reduction such as coupon may only
be available to a specific household.
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variables), as we will employ the latent class model (Kamakura and Russell,
1989).
The attribute similarity index We use the attribute similarity index to
express the state dependence in household brand choice behavior, following
Che et al. (2007).3 In their specification, each brand is allocated with a set
of attributes by a researcher. Each attribute has different levels, and brands
are assumed to be similar if they share the same level of attributes. The
degree of similarity between brands increases with the number of attribute
levels shared by these brands.
Employing the attribute similarity index enables a researcher to exam-
ine how brand attributes contribute to the perception of similarity between
brands among consumers. Apparently, this approach would yield richer in-
sight on consumer brand choice behavior and on brand positioning compared
to the prevalent approach such as employing the lagged brand indicator vari-
able. Specifically, the similarity between the brand purchased on the previous
occasion (brand k) and the brand a household faces on the current purchase
occasion (brand j) is specified as
simkj =
Ikj +
∑P
p=1 Ikjp · rp
1 +
∑P
p=1 rp
, (2.2)
where Ikj is an indicator variable taking unity if k = j, Ikjp is an indi-
cator variable taking unity if two brands share the same level of attribute
3The idea of the attribute similarity index can be found in previous papers (e.g., Lattin
(1987)), but the specification in previous literature requires questionnaire which explicitly
asks subjects for the perceived similarities between listed brands. The advantage of the
specification of Che et al. (2007) is that it does not require such information and similarities
between brands can be calibrated from the data, although the level of attributes shared
by brands must be arbitrarily set by researchers.
6
p = 1, · · · , P , and rp > 0 is importance weight associated with attribute p
to be estimated. As (2.2) implies, the similarity index is designed to take
value between 0 (brands are totally dissimilar) and 1 (brands are identical).
The parameter of the attribute similarity index, SDs, can either be positive
or negative which corresponds to inertia (i.e., a previous brand consumption
experience raises the probability of repurchasing a brand) and variety-seeking
(i.e., a previous brand consumption experience lowers the probability of re-
purchasing a brand) respectively. Following Che et al. (2007), we specify
SDs to be the function of demographic variables as
SDs = γs0 +Di · γs
where Di is vector of demographic characteristics of household i, γs0 is an
intercept term, and γs is vector of parameters for Di.4
The price endogeneity It is empirically well known that ignoring unob-
served product characteristics leads to a biased estimate of price effect as
they could be correlated with prices (Berry, 1994; Villas-Boas and Winer,
1999; Besanko et al., 1998, 2003; Nevo, 2001; Villas-Boas and Zhao, 2005).
This price endogeneity problem arises because if the desirable unobserved
product characteristic is not modeled, its hidden impact on utility will be
picked up by price, mitigating its negative effect on the utility (Train, 2009).
To avoid this problem, we employ an idea of two-stage least squares. The
details are explained in the next section.
4In estimating γs0 and γs, we write out each component of the term simkj · SDs and
estimate them by least squares. The detailed estimation algorithm can be provided upon
the request to the author.
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2.2 Supply−Side Specification
Following the preceding research, we assume that the retailer is a local mo-
nopolist which maximizes its joint category profit.5 The assumption of a
local monopolist is often justified by empirical reports which find that there
is little evidence of among store competitions (Besanko et al., 1998; Sudhir,
2001; Villas-Boas and Zhao, 2005; Che et al., 2007). We further assume that
there are multiple manufacturers which sell their brands through a common
retailer. Manufacturers are allowed to produce multiple brands.
To examine if firms forward-look in setting prices, we will test three mod-
els − namely static, myopic, and forward-looking model. The static model
is a standard multinomial logit model without state dependence. The my-
opic model assumes that firms account for state dependence in demand (i.e.,
firms consider the effect of a household previous brand choice via the at-
tribute similarity index) but do not account for the current price impact on
future profit, while those in forward-looking model are assumed to account
for such an effect (Che et al., 2007). In all models, we will estimate the mar-
gins of manufacturers and a retailer under four different games, which arise
from the combination of two games in horizontal strategic interaction among
manufacturers and two games in vertical strategic interaction between man-
ufacturers and a retailer. Two games in horizontal strategic interaction are
Bertrand competition and tacit collusion, where Bertrand competition refers
to own-brands profit maximizing behavior of each manufacturer and tacit
collusion refers to the behavior of manufacturers which collectively maximize
5A retailer could use the other pricing rules such as brand profit maximization where it
sets up a profit function for each brand. However, Sudhir (2001) empirically shows that a
retailer attains a maximum profit when it engages in category profit maximization, which
supports the assumption widely adopted in the literature.
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total profit from all brands in the market. Two games in vertical strategic
interaction are manufacturer Stackelberg and vertical Nash. In the man-
ufacturer Stackelberg game, manufacturers act as Stackelberg leaders with
respect to a retailer and choose their wholesale prices anticipating a reaction
from a retailer and wholesale prices of competing brands. In this case, the
retailer chooses retail prices to maximize its profit taking wholesale prices as
given. In the vertical Nash game, manufacturers and a retailer move simul-
taneously; they choose prices anticipating the profit maximizing behavior of
the others (Choi, 1991; Sudhir, 2001). We reserve the derivation of margins
in Appendix. Our derivation much follows Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005) and
Che et al. (2007).
After calculating margins of manufacturers and a retailer, we will estimate
marginal cost of each brand using variables such as prices of ingredients.
Finally, we will calculate likelihood for each model and game, and compare
the results by Vuong test statistics.
3 Estimation
3.1 Demand−Side Estimation
Pricing equation As prices may be correlated with unobserved demand
characteristics, we first set up the pricing equation
pjt = κ0 + zjt · κ1 + ηjt (3.1)
where zjt is an instrument which is correlated with pjt but not with ξjt, κ0
and κ1 are parameters to be estimated, and ηjt is a random error term. Note
that this equation is defined for calendar date t = 1, . . . , T . We estimate p̂jt
and η̂jt by ordinary least squares.
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Next, ξjt is obtained as residual in the following equation:
ln S˜jt − ln S˜0t = xjt · β + simkj · SD + ξjt (3.2)
where ln S˜jt and ln S˜0t are the log of observed market shares of brand j and
outside good at time t respectively.
If price endogeneity exists, the terms ξjt and ηjt will be correlated.6 This
correlation should arise as ηjt can represent both demand and cost shock
(i.e., if the unobserved demand characteristic is desirable, it is reasonable to
assume it incurs cost). In order to check the existence of price endogeneity,
we assume that ξjt and ηjt jointly follow the bivariate normal distribution as
correlation in that distribution equates dependence between them. We also
assume that their means are both zero, and their moments exist up to the
second order.
Likelihood function The likelihood of purchase history of household i is
written as
Li =
Ti∏
ti=1
∫ { J∏
j=0
[Prijti ]
yijti × f(ξjti |ηjti)× f(ηjti)
}
dξjti (3.3)
where yijti is an indicator function taking unity if household i chooses brand
j at time t and 0 otherwise, f(ξjt|ηjt) is the conditional density of ξjt, and
f(ηjt) is the density function of ηjt. Similarly to ξjti , the term ηjti is a subset
of ηjt, which is defined for all calendar dates in the panel. In this paper, we
employ the latent class model under which the likelihood function as in (3.3)
for household i is replaced with Li(Si = s), the likelihood of household i
belonging to the segment s or Si = s. Then we have the likelihood for whole
6As κ0 + zjt · κ1 is uncorrelated with ξjt by construction, ηjt represents a correlated
(with ξjt) part of pjt.
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panel data as
L =
I∏
i=1
{
S∏
s=1
Li(Si = s)× Pri(s)
}
(3.4)
where S is the number of segments and Pri(s) is the membership probability
to segment s of household i. Parameters βs and SDs are estimated by
maximizing this likelihood function.
3.2 Supply−Side Estimation
Marginal cost We specify the marginal cost equation as
mcjt = wj0 + inputjt ·wr (3.5)
where wj0 is a brand-specific intercept term, inputjt is vector of observable
cost shifters, and wr is corresponding vector of parameters. For the nota-
tional convenience, let w ≡ (wj0,wr). Now to estimate w, we utilize the
following equation
pjt − ĈMM jt − ĈMRjt = mcjt + εjt (3.6)
where ĈMM jt and ĈMRjt are computed margin of manufacturers and a
retailer for brand j at time t respectively, and εjt is a random error term.
Assuming the error term εjt follows a normal distribution with mean zero and
finite variance (which is to be estimated), the right-hand side of the equation
εjt = pjt − ĈMM jt − ĈMRjt − wj0 − inputjt ·wr (3.7)
also follows the normal distribution. Then we have the likelihood function
of the supply-side as
T∏
t=1
J∏
j=1
g(εjt) (3.8)
where g(·) is the marginal density of εjt, to estimate w and to calculate
Vuong test statistics.
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4 Data
We use scanner-panel data of yogurt purchases from anonymous retail chain
in the western Tokyo starting January 2007 to December 2008. There are
mainly two type yogurts; box type and snack type. We chose the latter type
for empirical analysis as the former type may also be used for cooking. There
were 157 brands during the period of study, but only 16 brands were on sale
throughout the period. Out of these brands, we chose 7 brands which had
enough purchasing records across stores, as we would like to use the average
yogurt prices in these stores as instruments for prices of yogurt in particular
store we would analyze.7 Next, we choose the store carrying these brands
with the least missing values. Then we chose households who only purchased
the selected 7 brands at least twice as we were to incorporate the effect of
state dependence. This lefts 183 households who made 15,194 shopping trips
and 2,550 yogurt purchases.8 In the data, 76.5% of purchases were made by
a female member of household. The average age of consumers in the panel
is 59.4 with standard deviations of 19.6. The minimum and maximum ages
of consumers in the panel are 14 and 94 respectively.
The information on chosen brands is summarized in Table 4.1. The at-
tributes we used for the attribute similarity index were “Raw milk usage”
(the proportion of raw milk in yogurt, 3 levels), “Fat level” (the fat amount
contained, 3 levels) and “Ager usage” (whether yogurt contains ager or not,
2 levels). Ager is used to produce so called “hard-type” yogurt, which has
7The other stores had at least 20 dates without a single sale of any brands during
two years. We chose to exclude them from our analysis, as brand switch could have been
attributed to the fact that some of them were out-of-stock in these stores. In this paper,
we are not focusing on this kind of forced brand switching behavior.
8We explicitly counted the shopping trips which did not lead to yogurt purchase for
those households to measure the share of outside option.
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Table 4.1: Summary of brands.
Average price Manufacturer Market Raw milk Fat level Ager Fat content Sugar content
(yen per gram) ID share usage usage (g/100g) (g/100g)
Brand 1 0.459 1 1.14% No Middle Yes 2.47 7.77
Brand 2 0.486 2 2.95% Partial Middle Yes 2.05 14.6
Brand 3 0.488 3 0.86% All High Yes 4.10 14.9
Brand 4 0.483 4 1.08% Partial Low No 1.76 15.2
Brand 5 1.113 4 3.22% Partial Middle No 3.04 9.73
Brand 6 1.113 4 1.35% Partial Low No 1.43 9.20
Brand 7 0.834 5 2.31% Partial Low No 1.88 13.4
texture like pudding unlike plain-type yogurt. Out of these brands, we are
especially interested in brand 3, 5, and 6; brand 3 is differentiated in terms
of taste (it is the only brand using only raw milk), brand 5 is the yogurt with
special lactic-acid bacilli, and brand 6 is a low fat version of brand 5. To
compare the margins of these brands with those of the others would answer
the question we addressed − whether these brands bring higher margins to
manufacturers. Relatively small numbers in market share column in Table
4.1 are because of outside option as consumers did not buy any of these 7
brands 87.0% of their shopping trips. Brand 7 is a brand containing a fruit,
which is thought to justify its higher retail price.
As for marginal cost shifters, we collected data of raw milk price, labor
wage in four prefectures where 7 brands of yogurt are produced, international
sugar price, cream price index, and international oil price.9 Because all data
were only available in monthly basis, we transformed them into weekly data
9The information sources are as follows: Raw milk price and cream price index are ob-
tained from the database of Jmilk (2014); labor wage in four prefectures are obtained from
statistical departments of corresponding prefectures; international sugar price is obtained
from the database of Agriculture & Livestock Industries Corporation (2014); international
oil price is obtained from U.S. Energy Information Administration (2014).
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by the linear filtering process employed by Slade (1995):
Wt = 0.25Wt−1 + 0.50Wt + 0.25Wt+1
where Wt in week t is the input price in the corresponding month (Besanko
et al., 1998). As for international sugar price, we multiplied it to the sugar
amount each brand contains. Also, since cream is mixed in yogurt to increase
fat content, we multiplied cream price index to the fat amount each brand
contains. We used raw milk price as they were, and we took log for labor wage
and for international oil price because their scales were of different orders
of magnitude. In addition, we employed manufacturer dummy variables to
incorporate firm-specific cost structure with manufacturer 1 as baseline.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Demand-Side Results
We estimate the latent class model by increasing the number of segments un-
til there is no improvement in AIC. We find that the model with six segments
maximizes AIC. Additionally, we construct and estimate a multinomial logit
model without state dependence and the model with lagged brand choice
dummy variable with the same number of segments to compare the fits. The
model fit is presented in Table 5.1. As we see from Table 5.1, there is large
improvement in log-likelihood by employing lagged brand choice dummy vari-
able model relative to a multinomial logit model as log-likelihood improves
from -9,056.5 to -6,725.2. However, the additional improvement by employ-
ing the model with the attribute similarity index instead of the lagged brand
choice dummy variable is minimal, as log-likelihood only improves by 0.88%.
Nonetheless, we retain the result of the model with the attribute similarity
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Table 5.1: Model Fit.
Model specification Multinomial logit The model with the lagged The model with the
model brand choice dummy variable attribute similarity index
Number of parameters 54 60 72
Log-likelihood -9,056.5 -6,725.2 -6,666.2
AIC 18,221 13,570 13,476
index (henceforth “optimal model”) since it is still the best fitting model.
The parameter estimates of the optimal model with standard errors are
presented in Table 5.2. All variables are significant at 1% level. “Brand”
in Table 5.2 represent brand-specific intercept terms relative to outside op-
tions, presented below “Demographics” entry are parameters for calculating
SDs, which is a parameter associated with the similarity index in (2.2), and
presented below “The attribute similarity index” entry are the estimates of
importance weight for two attributes in calculating the attribute similarity
index.10 Because we find that using all three attributes results in anomalies
in estimation, we choose to remove “Fat level” attribute. We see that “Ager
usage” has almost as six times greater effect as that of “Raw milk usage”
with importance weights of 0.358 and 0.060 respectively. This suggests that
perceived similarity between brands largely depends on the type of yogurt
(i.e., whether yogurt is hard-type or plain-type). Estimated segment sizes
are reported below price coefficients in Table 5.2.
10We only have importance weight estimates for segment 1 in Table 5.2. This is because
we estimated them with the model without segment and used these estimates for the
models with the greater number of segments. In other words, we assumed perceptions
of similarities between brands were common across segments as in Che et al. (2007). In
fact, estimating the model without this assumption would have increased the number of
parameters by 66, and this could have made the estimation unstable.
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Table 5.2: Parameter estimates of the optimal model.
Segment 1 Segment 2 Segment 3 Segment 4 Segment 5 Segment 6
Brand 1 1.803 -2.733 -3.299 1.635 -1.071 -4.097
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Brand 2 3.067 -10.24 0.119 3.973 2.577 -20.62
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0021) (0.0000)
Brand 3 2.358 0.829 -4.435 1.887 1.629 -2.142
(0.0002) (0.0028) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Brand 4 2.245 -1.827 3.938 -0.403 1.054 -2.943
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0037) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0002)
Brand 5 14.00 3.580 4.542 8.090 3.525 5.026
(0.0002) (0.0093) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.003)
Brand 6 12.88 -0.598 -2.733 14.50 4.882 4.045
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002)
Brand 7 7.178 -1.093 2.702 7.478 -2.304 -1.478
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Price Coefficient -17.10 -1.754 -14.30 -21.12 -10.90 -5.812
(0.0025) (0.0048) (0.0042) (0.0006) (0.0037) (0.0077)
Segment sizes 41.3% 2.7% 8.9% 30.4% 6.9% 9.8%
Demographics
Intercept 0.518 4.119 1.151 -7.100 -1.525 0.099
(0.0131) (0.0134) (0.0585) (0.008) (0.0236) (0.0062)
Male dummy 0.696 4.138 -1.953 -1.786 0.517 -1.419
(0.0015) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Age (logged) 0.143 -2.644 1.641 2.283 0.962 -0.152
(0.0471) (0.0536) (0.2405) (0.0414) (0.0943) (0.0231)
The attribute similarity index
Raw milk usage 0.060
(0.0016)
Ager usage 0.358
(0.0012)
Number of parameters 72
Number of observations 15,194
Log-likelihood -6,666.2
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State dependence tendencies across households are derived from the at-
tribute similarity index calculated based on the estimated importance weights
of attributes and SDs calculated from demographic variables of households
and parameter estimates for them. They are presented in Table 5.3. The
Table 5.3: State dependence tendencies across segments.
Segment 1 Segment 2 Segment 3 Segment 4 Segment 5 Segment 6
Male 1.464 3.646 2.058 -4.905 0.670 -1.584
Female 0.768 -0.491 4.012 -3.119 0.152 -0.165
Weighted Average 0.931 0.481 3.553 -3.539 0.274 -0.498
values in rows “Male” and “Female” are corresponding values for each group,
calculated with mean age. We see that households in segment 4 and 6 are
variety-seekers from Table 5.3. The rest is almost all inertial. With this
along with the results in Table 5.2, about 40.2% of households under study
are assumed to be variety-seekers. However, also from Table 5.2, we do not
see the consistent relationship between state dependence tendencies and de-
mographic variables. Being male affects the utility of the similar brand to
previously purchased one either positively or negatively, and the same is true
for age.
Now we briefly summarize the results presented in Table 5.2. First of
all, two largest segments are segment 1 and 4, consisting of 71.7% of the
market as “Segment sizes” indicate. Though they are similar in terms of
the magnitude of price sensitivities and signs for brand dummies, Table 5.3
indicates that they differ substantially in their state dependence tendencies;
while segment 1 shows moderate inertia, segment 4 exhibits the greatest
variety-seeking tendency among all segments. Segment 1 and 4 being large
and price sensitive should induce rigorous price competition in the market,
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despite the fact that state dependence exists within the targeted segment.
As we see from Table 5.2, all segments except for segment 1 have varying
number of negative coefficients for brand dummies. For example, segment 2
and 6 endow positive values only to two brands (brand 3 and 5 for segment
2 and brand 5 and 6 for segment 6). This combined with the fact that
segment 6 is variety-seeking implies that households in segment 6 are likely
to often switch between brand 5 and 6, which turn out to be the same
product with brand 6 being a low fat version of brand 5. This segment
is thought to be health-conscious as brand 5 and 6 are the yogurt with
immune-enhanced feature. Segment 6 consists 9.8% of the market according
to Table 5.2. Households in segment 3 are the least price sensitive with
strong inertia with size of 8.9%. Segment 5 is modest in all aspects with
size of 6.9%. The description of such segment can be difficult, but what-if
analysis would be helpful to understand the behavior of the segment, which
is another advantage of the structural equilibrium model (Kadiyali et al.,
2001).
5.2 Supply-Side Results
In this subsection, we will present the results of margins, marginal cost and
model comparison. Though the actual calculations proceed in this order, we
first present the result of model comparison as it helps the interpretation of
the results of margins.
Log-likelihood for supply-side and Vuong test statistics After cal-
culating margins, we calculated the log-likelihood for supply-side in (3.8) and
Vuong test statistics to compare the fits of three models and games in these
models as presented in Table 5.4. As we see, the vertical Nash−Bertrand
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Table 5.4: The log-likelihood and Vuong test statistics under each game and
model.
Log-likelihood (Vuong test statistics)
Vertical Interaction Horizontal Interaction Static model Myopic model Forward-looking model
manufacturer Stackelberg Bertrand competition -209.76 -242.45 -118.10
(22.64) (6.11) (44.05)
Tacit collusion -216.13 -214.74 -129.53
(38.24) (53.30) (45.64)
vertical Nash Bertrand competition -203.48 -134.75 -37.99
(−) (−) (−)
Tacit collusion -209.56 -148.80 -49.84
(58.94) (34.53) (28.82)
competition game dominates across all models in terms of log-likelihood.
Thus Vuong test statistics in each column are with respect to this game.
They indicate that the vertical Nash−Bertrand competition game is statis-
tically better than the other games. Moreover, log-likelihood shows that
forward-looking model fits the data most with value -37.99. We also com-
pared the Vuong test statistics across models, to find that the best-fitting
model (the vertical Nash−Bertrand competition game in forward-looking
model) is statistically better than any other models and games.
Margins The margins (in yen per gram) under three models are presented
in Table 5.5. Presented in the entries of “Average delta” in the last row
are the mean value of ∆j in (B.3) in Appendix B for each brand, which is
defined to be θj2|j1−
∑J
l=1,l "=j θj2|l1, where θj2|j1 is the probability of purchasing
brand j in period 2 given the purchase of the brand in period 1 and θj2|l1 is
defined likewise for brand l (please see Appendix for detail). In a nutshell,
∆j evaluates how the market share of brand j changes from the previous time
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Table 5.5: Margins (unit: yen per gram) under each model and game.
Brand 1 Brand 2 Brand 3 Brand 4 Brand 5 Brand 6 Brand 7
Average Prices 0.451 0.504 0.513 0.480 1.127 1.128 0.859
Static model
Retail margin 0.112 0.139 0.167 0.157 0.145 0.119 0.167
(0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0013) (0.0005) (0.0015) (0.0006) (0.0016)
manufacturer Stackelberg
Bertrand competition 0.093 0.137 0.124 0.141 0.107 0.108 0.133
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0016) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0020)
Tacit collusion 0.101 0.144 0.131 0.156 0.112 0.112 0.143
(0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0021)
vertical Nash
Bertrand competition 0.102 0.132 0.159 0.142 0.139 0.115 0.156
(0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0015) (0.0003) (0.0015) (0.0007) (0.0015)
Myopic model
Retail margin 0.088 0.105 0.167 0.121 0.198 0.135 0.083
(0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0043) (0.0024) (0.0042) (0.0023) (0.0019)
manufacturer Stackelberg
Bertrand competition 0.067 0.097 0.011 0.145 0.025 0.083 0.068
(0.0005) (0.0028) (0.0057) (0.0016) (0.0028) (0.0010) (0.0009)
Tacit collusion 0.083 0.127 0.029 0.172 0.028 0.086 0.086
(0.0010) (0.0023) (0.0060) (0.0017) (0.0030) (0.0010) (0.0019)
vertical Nash
Bertrand competition 0.072 0.082 0.140 0.098 0.192 0.131 0.066
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0037) (0.0016) (0.0041) (0.0023) (0.0011)
Forward-looking model
Retail margin 0.051 0.109 0.105 0.104 0.313 0.187 0.103
(0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0031) (0.0024) (0.0051) (0.0026) (0.0019)
manufacturer Stackelberg
Bertrand competition 0.039 0.100 0.007 0.125 0.039 0.115 0.085
(0.0006) (0.0028) (0.0044) (0.0015) (0.0033) (0.0014) (0.0010)
Tacit collusion 0.048 0.131 0.018 0.147 0.045 0.119 0.107
(0.0010) (0.0023) (0.0046) (0.0015) (0.0035) (0.0013) (0.0021)
vertical Nash
Bertrand competition 0.042 0.084 0.088 0.084 0.304 0.182 0.083
(0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0026) (0.0016) (0.0050) (0.0027) (0.0011)
Average delta 0.444 -0.035 0.396 0.151 -0.621 -0.410 -0.264
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period in response to a minute change of market share of the same brand.
We omit the margins of the vertical Nash−Tacit collusion game as they are
identical to retail margins. It should be noted that, in view of Table 5.4,
margins in the vertical Nash−Bertrand competition game in forward-looking
entries are the most accurate ones within the framework in Table 5.5, and
those in the other entries are counter-factual in the sense that, had these sorts
of games and perspectives were in play, these margins would have resulted.
Now we briefly overview the results in Table 5.5.
First of all, manufacturers’ margins under tacit collusion always exceed
those under Bertrand competition as expected. However, for brand 1, 3, 5
and 6, the margins under manufacturer Stackelberg are lower than vertical
Nash counterparts in both myopic and forward-looking models regardless of
which game in horizontal interaction is assumed. This is one piece of evidence
that manufacturer Stackelberg game between manufacturers and a retailer
cannot be justified with data.
Comparing margins under myopic and forward-looking models, we see
that both manufacturers and a retailer charge more margins for brands with
negative ∆j and charge less for those with positive ∆j in forward-looking
model relative to myopic model. In other words, forward-looking firms would
price lower if brands are likely to be repurchased and higher if they would
be switched to. This is consistent with economical rationale. In comparing
static and myopic models, however, we do not see such relationship for either
manufacturers nor a retailer.
Remember that brand 3 has a distinct taste advantage due to the fact that
it uses only raw milk, while brand 5 and 6 are the yogurt with special lactic-
acid bacilli. Therefore we expect that these brands to command higher mar-
gins. As expected, brand 3, 5 and 6 command three largest margins under the
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vertical Nash−Bertrand competition game in forward-looking model (0.088,
0.304, and 0.182 respectively), which we estimate to reflect Japanese yogurt
market.11 Meanwhile, brand 3 and 5 have the second least and the least mar-
gins respectively under the manufacturer Stackelberg−Bertrand competition
counter-factual (0.007 and 0.039), which is another evidence that manufac-
turer Stackelberg game cannot be justified with data.
These facts and the market being characterized by the vertical Nash−Bertrand
competition game jointly imply that differentiating brands 3,5, and 6 enable
manufacturers to charge the three highest margins among the seven brands.
In this sense, manufacturers’ efforts to differentiate their brands are reason-
ably rewarded.
However, we must note that a retailer also charges the largest and the
second largest margins for brand 5 and 6 and charges the fourth largest
margin for brand 3. In fact, the amount of retailer’s margins in (A.3) are
higher than manufacturers’ margins in (A.17) for all brands in the vertical
Nash−Bertrand competition game. These facts lead us to the conclusion
that a retailer has more power than manufacturers. The decreasing price
of yogurt over the last decade is at least partially due to decreasing power
of manufacturers relative to the retailer in addition to competition among
manufacturers as indicated by our result. The existence of fierce competi-
tion among manufacturers makes sense, as 157 yogurt brands existed in the
market in January 2007 to December 2008.
11The margins of Brand 1 and 5 under the manufacturer Stackelberg−Bertrand com-
petition game in forward-looking model are the same in Table 5.5 but this is because of
rounding. The margin of brand 1 is slightly larger than that of brand 5, even though the
difference is minimal.
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Marginal costs The estimation result for marginal cost in forward-looking
model is presented in Table 5.6.12 We find that after including manufac-
turer dummies, labor wage and international sugar price (multiplied by sugar
amount) result in negative coefficients in all models and games, thus we ex-
clude them.13 We find that remaining variables − cream price index (mul-
tiplied by fat amount), raw milk price, and international oil price − have
positive coefficients in manufacturer Stackelberg game, even though t-values
of raw milk price and international oil price are not necessarily significant.
However, only international oil price has a positive coefficient in forward-
looking model under vertical Nash game regardless of horizontal interaction.
The high values for manufacturers 4 and 5 are consistent with the fact that
manufacturer 4 produces brand 5 and 6 and manufacturer 5 produces brand
7.
The price endogeneity After estimating ξ̂jt and η̂jt, we tested the cor-
relation between them using one of Pearson’s product moment correlation
coefficient test. The test reveals that they are significantly correlated and
thus prices are proven to be endogenously determined, which is consistent
with the general finding in literature.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we empirically analyzed Japanese yogurt market incorporat-
ing consumer heterogeneity, consumer state dependence, forward-looking be-
havior of manufacturers and a retailer, and price endogeneity arises from
12Results for the other models can be provided upon the request to the author.
13If we use only labor wage, their coefficients are positive. The effect of labor wage
seems to be absorbed by manufacturer dummies.
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Table 5.6: Marginal cost estimation in forward-looking model.
manufacturer Stackelberg Bertrand competition Tacit collusion
Estimate Std.Err t-value p-value Estimate Std.Err t-value p-value
Intercept -0.742 0.233 -3.182 0.002 -0.816 0.240 -3.408 0.001
Manufacturer 2 -0.041 0.026 -1.598 0.110 -0.061 0.027 -2.319 0.021
Manufacturer 3 -0.026 0.030 -0.880 0.379 -0.031 0.031 -1.004 0.316
Manufacturer 4 0.287 0.022 13.22 0.000 0.287 0.022 12.87 0.000
Manufacturer 5 0.346 0.027 13.04 0.000 0.335 0.027 12.28 0.000
Cream price index 0.133 0.032 4.137 0.000 0.139 0.033 4.192 0.000
International oil price 0.038 0.024 1.546 0.123 0.037 0.025 1.480 0.139
Raw milk price 0.003 0.002 1.104 0.270 0.003 0.002 1.278 0.202
vertical Nash Bertrand competition Tacit collusion
Estimate Std.Err t-value p-value Estimate Std.Err t-value p-value
Intercept 0.196 0.082 2.401 0.017 0.187 0.084 2.225 0.026
Manufacturer 2 -0.048 0.021 -2.280 0.023 -0.063 0.021 -2.918 0.004
Manufacturer 3 -0.037 0.021 -1.778 0.076 -0.044 0.021 -2.075 0.038
Manufacturer 4 0.163 0.017 9.563 0.000 0.161 0.018 9.193 0.000
Manufacturer 5 0.315 0.021 15.11 0.000 0.304 0.021 14.17 0.000
International oil price 0.037 0.018 2.015 0.044 0.037 0.019 1.957 0.051
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the interaction between unobserved demand characteristics and prices. Our
demand-side findings are consistent with those of previous literature; con-
sumers are heterogeneous in their responsiveness to marketing variables and
degrees of state dependence. On supply-side, we find prices are endogenously
determined, manufacturers engage in Bertrand competition game, manufac-
turers and a retailer play vertical Nash game, and they set prices considering
their impact on future profit.
We find that brands with differentiating features (brand 3, 5 and 6) do
command higher margins, proving that manufacturers’ efforts are rewarded.
However, a retailer also charges higher margins for these brands and obtains
larger split of the profit. We also find that there are rigorous competitions
among manufacturers in this market which is consistent with the findings in
the other papers such as Nevo (2001) and Che et al. (2007), where Bertrand
competition was the case in the U.S. cereal market with large number of
brands. Finally, our work adds another evidence to the body of literature in
this field of intersection between marketing and neo empirical industrial or-
ganization, as lack of empirical study is general concern in this area (Kadiyali
et al., 2001).
One major limitation of this research is the assumption of a monopolistic
retailer as retailers are likely to compete in reality. In fact, “National Survey
of Prices” conducted by Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Communications in Japan indicates that the average retail prices of yogurt
are higher in stores with no competitors around. Incorporating retail com-
petition in the framework employed in this study would be an interesting
source of future research. The other possible direction of future research is
inclusion the effect of store brand. This topic is common in the literature,
and widely investigated in the context such as its effect on power balance
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between manufacturers, store loyalty and so forth. As state dependence is
often neglected in these analysis, investigating the effect of store brand in
the presented framework may provide new insight to the literature.
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Appendix
In section A, we derive margins in myopic model. In section B, we derive
margins in forward-looking model.
A Margins in Myopic Model
We start with margins of a retailer as it will be used in calculating margins
of manufacturers.
A.1 Margins of a Retailer
The profit function for the retailer is defined as
piR =
J∑
j=1
(pjt − wjt)SjtM (A.1)
where wjt is the wholesale price for brand j at time t, Sjt is market share,
and M is the market size. The retail margin for brand j is pjt − wjt.
Now by partially differentiating (A.1) with respect to each retail price pjt,
setting them zero, and algebraic manipulations, we have
p1t − w1t
...
pJt − wJt
 = −

∂S1t
∂p1t
, · · · , ∂SJt∂p1t
...
∂S1t
∂pJt
, · · · , ∂SJt∂pJt

−1
S1t
...
SJt
 . (A.2)
Using the notation of Che et al. (2007), we have
(pt −wt) = Φ−1t St (A.3)
where (pt−wt) ≡ (p1t−w1t, · · · , pJt−wJt)T is J×1 vector of retail margins,
Φt is J × J matrix with elements
Φjkt = −∂Skt
∂pjt
for brand j, k = 1, · · · , J , and St is J × 1 vector St = (S1t, . . . , SJt)T .
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A.2 Margins of Manufacturers
Now we derive margins of manufacturers under different games. Unlike in
the retailer’s case, the profit function of manufacturers differs depending on
which game in horizontal strategic interaction is assumed. The profit function
pif of manufacturer f under Bertrand competition is given by
pif =
∑
j∈Jf
(wjt −mcjt)SjtM, (A.4)
where Jf is a subset of brands produced by manufacturer f and mcjt is the
marginal cost of producing brand j at time t. The manufacturer’s margin
from brand j is wjt −mcjt. On the other hand, the total profit function pi∀f
of collusive manufacturers is given by
pi∀f =
J∑
j=1
(wjt −mcjt)SjtM.
The first order condition of the profit function in tacit collusion game is
∂pi∀f
∂wlt
= M
[
Slt +
J∑
j=1
[
(wjt −mcjt)
J∑
k=1
∂Sjt
∂pkt
· ∂pkt
∂wlt
]]
= 0 (A.5)
for l = 1, . . . , J . By algebraic manipulation, we have
w1t −mc1t
...
wJt −mcJt
 = −


∂p1t
∂w1t
, · · · , ∂pJt∂w1t
...
∂p1t
∂wJt
, · · · , ∂pJt∂wJt
 ·

∂S1t
∂p1t
, · · · , ∂SJt∂p1t
...
∂S1t
∂pJt
, · · · , ∂SJt∂pJt


−1
S1t
...
SJt
 ,
(A.6)
where the left hand side of equation (A.6) is J × 1 vector of manufac-
turers’ margins. The first order condition of profit function of Bertrand
competition can be derived similarly. In equation (A.6), the terms Sjt
and ∂Sjt/∂pkt can be directly obtained from the estimated demand pa-
rameters but ∂pkt/∂wlt cannot be. Thus we must infer these terms in-
directly, and the difference between manufacturer Stackelberg and vertical
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Nash stems from how these terms are specified. We start with the manu-
facturer Stackelberg−Tacit collusion game because margins under the man-
ufacturer Stackelberg−Bertrand competition game is a special case of those
under the manufacturer Stackelberg−Tacit collusion game.
A.2.1 Margins under the manufacturer Stackelberg−Tacit collu-
sion game
To infer ∂pkt/∂wlt, we exploit the first order condition of the retail profit
function defined in (A.1);
∂piR
∂pgt
= Sgt +
J∑
k=1
[
(pkt − wkt)∂Skt
∂pgt
]
= 0 (A.7)
for g = 1, . . . , J with the market size M removed. Since a retailer is assumed
to maximize the category profit, the change in wholesale price of one brand
would affect all retail prices in the category. Thus we totally differentiate
(A.7) with respect to prices pjt, j = 1, . . . , J , and wholesale price wlt for
brand l, to obtain, for some g,
J∑
j=1
[
∂Sgt
∂pjt
+
∂Sjt
∂pgt
+
J∑
k=1
(pkt − wkt) ∂
2Skt
∂pjt∂pgt
]
dpjt − ∂Slt
∂pgt
· dwlt = 0.
(A.8)
Denoting the terms inside the bracket on the left hand side of equation
(A.8) as ν(g, j), we have the set of J equations for some l as
ν(1, 1)dp1t + ν(1, 2)dp2t + · · ·+ ν(1, J)dpJt = ∂Slt∂p1t · dwlt,
...
ν(J, 1)dp1t + ν(J, 2)dp2t + · · ·+ ν(J, J)dpJt = ∂Slt∂pJt · dwlt.
(A.9)
Defining Gg ≡ (ν(g, 1), . . . , ν(g, J)), we rewrite the expression in (A.9) in
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matrix form and rearrange it as
∂p1t/∂wlt
...
∂pJt/∂wlt
 =

G1
...
GJ

−1
·

∂Slt
∂p1t
...
∂Slt
∂pJt
 , (A.10)
assuming the inverse of the J × J matrix (G1, . . . , GJ)T exists. Transposing
both sides of equation (A.10) and stacking them vertically for l = 1, · · · , J ,
we have
∂p1t
∂w1t
, · · · , ∂pJt∂w1t
...
∂p1t
∂wJt
, · · · , ∂pJt∂wJt
 =

∂S1t
∂p1t
, · · · , ∂S1t∂pJt
...
∂SJt
∂p1t
, · · · , ∂SJt∂pJt
 · (GT1 , · · · , GTJ )−1 . (A.11)
Substituting (A.11) into (A.6), we have the manufacturers’ margins under
the manufacturer Stackelberg−Tacit collusion game as
(wt −mct) = −(ΦTt G−1Φt)−1St (A.12)
where (wt −mct) = (w1t −mc1t, · · · , wJt −mcJt)T and G = (GT1 , · · · , GTJ ).
A.2.2 Margins under the manufacturer Stackelberg−Bertrand com-
petition game
In Bertrand competition, each manufacturer maximizes a profit from its own
brands. Thus in Bertrand competition, (A.6) applies only to the brands a
particular manufacturer produces. This requires replacement of the third
term Φt in matrix (ΦTt G
−1Φt)−1 in (A.12) with Φt · ∗Ω, where ·∗ denotes
element-by-element multiplication, and Ω is J × J matrix whose (j, k) el-
ements are indicator functions taking unity if brands j and k are made by
the same manufacturer and zero otherwise. Then we have the manufacturers’
margins under the manufacturer Stackelberg−Bertrand competition game as
(wt −mct) = −(ΦTt G−1Φt · ∗Ω)−1St. (A.13)
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A.2.3 Margins under the vertical Nash−Tacit collusion game
In the vertical Nash game, manufacturers and a retailer move simultaneously.
More specifically, manufacturers set wholesale price expecting a certain level
of retail margin for the brand; a retailer sets its retail margin for each brand
based on its profit maximizing behavior. Now by assumption, we have the
relationship
∂(pjt − wjt)
∂wjt
= 0
or equivalently
∂pjt
∂wjt
= 1 (A.14)
for all j = 1, . . . , J since the retail margin of brand j, pjt − wjt, is not
affected by the wholesale price of the brand as manufacturers and a retailer
move simultaneously. Similarly, since the retail margin of brand, pjt − wjt,
is not affected by the wholesale price of the other brands, we have
∂(pjt − wjt)
∂wkt
= 0
or equivalently
∂pjt
∂wkt
= 0 (A.15)
for j = 1, . . . , J , j &= k.14 Finally, from (A.14) and (A.15), the matrix
with elements ∂pjt/∂wkt on the right-hand side of equation (A.6) becomes
14We note that this behavioral principle of retailer is consistent with its profit maxi-
mizing behavior, as the predetermined retail margins are determined from the first order
condition of its profit function
∂piR
∂pgt
= Sgt +
J∑
k=1
[
(pkt − wkt)∂Skt
∂pgt
]
= 0
even in the vertical Nash game.
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an identity matrix and equation (A.6) becomes
w1t −mc1t
...
wJt −mcJt
 = −

∂S1t
∂p1t
, · · · , ∂SJt∂p1t
...
∂S1t
∂pJt
, · · · , ∂SJt∂pJt

−1
S1t
...
SJt
 .
Thus we have manufacturers’ margins under the vertical Nash−Tacit collu-
sion game as
(wt −mct) = Φ−1t St (A.16)
which is identical to margin of the retailer. This makes sense as the vertical
Nash game assumes approximately equal power between manufacturers and
a retailer (Choi, 1991).
A.2.4 Margins under the vertical Nash−Bertrand competition game
Since the retailer behaves the same independent of whether manufacturers
compete or tacitly collude, the conditions (A.14) and (A.15) still hold in
the vertical Nash−Bertrand competition game. And by the same reasoning
of the manufacturer Stackelberg−Bertrand competition game, we have the
manufacturers’ margins under the vertical Nash−Bertrand competition game
as
(wt −mct) = (Φt · ∗Ω)−1St. (A.17)
Table A.1 summarizes margins under each game.
Table A.1: The manufacturers’ margin under myopic model.
Bertrand competition Tacit collusion
manufacturer Stackelberg −(ΦTt G−1Φt · ∗Ω)−1St −(ΦTt G−1Φt)−1St
vertical Nash (Φt · ∗Ω)−1St Φ−1t St
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B Margins in Forward-Looking Model
Here we derive the margins in forward-looking model. We start with the
margin of a retailer.
B.1 Margins of a Retailer (Forward-Looking Model)
The objective function of one-period forward-looking retailer is VR = piR1 +
δpiR2, where piRt is a profit function defined in (A.1) for period t = 1, 2, and
the term δ is some exogenously given discount rate. Then the first order
conditions are ∂piR1∂pk1 + δ
∑J
j=1
∂piR2
∂Sj2
· ∂Sj2∂Sj1 ·
∂Sj1
∂pk1
= 0
∂piR2
∂pk2
= 0
(B.1)
for k = 1, . . . , J . In (B.1), the first equation corresponds to the first order
condition of the first period profit function and the second equation cor-
responds to that of the second period profit. As the first order condition
in the second period is already known, we only concern for the first equa-
tion in (B.1) in the following derivation. Furthermore, in that equation, the
unknown terms are ∂piR2/∂Sj2 and ∂Sj2/∂Sj1.
Clearly, ∂piR2/∂Sj2 is (pj2 − wj2). To calculate ∂Sj2/∂Sj1, we exploit the
following relationship:
Sj2 = θj2|j1 × Sj1 +
J∑
l=1,l "=j
θj2|l1 × Sl1 (B.2)
where θj2|j1 is the probability of purchasing brand j in period 2 given the
purchase of the brand in period 1, and θj2|l1 is defined likewise. Since the
market share sums up to one, the term Sl1 is rewritten as Sl1 = (1 − S11 −
· · ·−Sl−1,1−Sl+1,1− · · ·−SJ1) for all l = 1, . . . , J , l &= j, which includes the
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term −Sj1. Thus, the partial derivative of the second term on the right-hand
side of equation (B.2) with respect to Sj1 is
∂
[∑J
l=1,l "=j θj2|l1 × Sl1
]
∂Sj1
= −
J∑
l=1,l "=j
θj2|l1
as ∂Sl1/∂Sj1 = −1 for l = 1, . . . , J , l &= j. Thus taking partial derivative of
both sides of (B.2) with respect to Sj1, we have
∂Sj2
∂Sj1
= θj2|j1 −
J∑
l=1,l "=j
θj2|l1. (B.3)
We define the right-hand side of equation (B.3) as ∆j.
In the same manner as in the derivation of vector (pt −wt), the second
term on the left-hand side of the first equation in (B.1) can be expressed by
matrix form as
δ

∂S11
∂p11
, · · · , ∂SJ1∂p11
...
∂S11
∂pJ1
, · · · , ∂SJ1∂pJ1
 ·

∆1, · · · , 0
...
0, · · · ,∆J
 ·

p12 − w12
...
pJ2 − wJ2

where the second matrix is diagonal matrix with diagonal elements ∆j, which
we will express as ∆. Thus we have the margin in the first period as
p11 − w11
...
pJ1 − wJ1
 = −

∂S11
∂p11
, · · · , ∂SJ1∂p11
...
∂S11
∂pJ1
, · · · , ∂SJ1∂pJ1

−1
·

S11
...
SJ1
− δ

∆1, · · · , 0
...
0, · · · ,∆J
 ·

p12 − w12
...
pJ2 − wJ2

or (p1−w1) = {ΦT}−1S1− δ∆(p2−w2), assuming the inverse of ΦT exists.
To derive margins in forward-looking model, we first calculate the margins in
the myopic case from week 2, and use these margins in calculating margins
in forward-looking model starting from week 1.
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B.2 Margins of Manufacturers (Forward-Looking Model)
The derivation of margins of manufacturers in one-period forward-looking
model much follows the case of the retailer. Here we consider the margin in
the manufacturer Stackelberg−Tacit collusion game as those under the other
games are special case of this game. The objective function is VM = pif1+δpif2
and the first order conditions are
∂pif1
∂wk1
+ δ
∑J
j=1
∂pif2
∂Sj2
· ∂Sj2∂Sj1 ·
∂Sj1
∂wk1
= 0
∂pif2
∂wk2
= 0.
(B.4)
As was the case in (B.1), the first equation of (B.4) corresponds to the first
order condition of the first period profit function and the second equation
corresponds to that of the second period profit. Clearly, ∂pif2/∂Sj2 = (wj2−
mcj2). Then the product of this term and ∂Sj1/∂wk1 turns out to be the
second term of the first order condition of the profit function of manufacturers
in (A.5) except for the subscript being 2 instead of t in wholesale price wj2
and marginal cost mcj2. Then this product term can be written as
∂p11
∂w11
, · · · , ∂pJ1∂w11
...
∂p11
∂wJ1
, · · · , ∂pJ1∂wJ1
 ·

∂S11
∂p11
, · · · , ∂SJ1∂p11
...
∂S11
∂pJ1
, · · · , ∂SJ1∂pJ1
 ·

w12 −mc12
...
wJ2 −mcJ2

or simply ΦTt G
−1Φt(w2−mc2). Thus the second term on the left-hand side of
the first equation of (B.4) becomes δ(ΦTt G
−1Φt)∆(w2−mc2). Then we have
S1+ΦTt G
−1Φt(w1−mc1)+ δ(ΦTt G−1Φt)∆(w2−mc2) = 0 or (w1−mc1) =
−(ΦTt G−1Φt)−1S1−δ ·∆(w2−mc2), assuming the inverse of ΦTt G−1Φt exists.
The margins in the other games are derived similarly as we presented in the
myopic case. They are summarized in Table B1.
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Table B.1: The manufacturers’ margins under forward-looking model in the
first period.
Bertrand competition Tacit collusion
manufacturer Stackelberg −(ΦTt G−1Φt · ∗Ω)−1S1 −(ΦTt G−1Φt)−1S1
−δ ·∆(w2 −mc2) −δ ·∆(w2 −mc2)
vertical Nash (Φt · ∗Ω)−1St Φ−1t St
−δ ·∆(w2 −mc2) −δ ·∆(w2 −mc2)
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